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ABSTRACT 
Since the late 90s, the music industry has seen its global turnover 
declining rapidly and has not been compensated yet by the growth of 
incomes generated by online music services. Actually, such services face a 
number of transaction costs (TC) concerning licensing music rights, 
notably in Europe where markets are still organized at a national level. 
This article analyzes the problems faced by these services in Europe with a 
focus on the complex licensing process. In particular, this article analyzes 
the TC related to licensing rights for online music services. The now 
established TC theory has rarely been applied for the analysis of digital 
content markets. The emphasis is put on the TC faced by Creative Upstarts 
in the fragmented European Union (EU) market. 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous online music services have emerged over the past years1 and 
the online offer of titles steadily increased.2 As a result, digital channels 
accounted for 32% of record companies' revenues in 2011.3 
However, the growth of online music services does not compensate for 
the decrease of revenues, which stemmed from the decline of the compact 
disc.4 Worse, the European online music market remains fragmented with 
few pan-European services. One result is that the European market still lags 
behind the U.S., whereas the EU accounts for more Internet users. 5 
What are the reasons for this European development? What could be the 
consequences for the Creative Upstarts? To answer, this article focuses on 
I. MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL Ho, FLOOR 64, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED 
LoOK AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 28 (20 I 2), available at http://www.te 
chdirt.com/skyisrising/. 
2. Thirteen million tracks were licensed at the global level in 2010. INT'L FED'N OF 
THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY (IFPI), IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011: MUSIC AT THE 
ToucH OF A BuTTON 5 (20 II) [hereinafter IFPI 2011 a], available at http://www.ifpi.org/cont 
entllibrary/DMR2011.pdf. 
3. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY (IFPI), IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC 
REPORT 2012: EXPANDING CHOICE. GOING GLOBAL 6 (2012), [hereinafter IFPI 2012], 
available at http://www.ifpi.org/contentllibrary/DMR2012.pdf. 
4. However the global trade value of the recorded music industry grew by! 10.3% in 
2012. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY (IFPl), IFPl DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 
2013: ENGINE OF A DIGITAL WORLD 6 (2013) [hereinafter lFPI 2013], available at 
http://www.ifpi.org/contentllibrary/DMR20 13.pdf. 
5. KEA EUR. AFF. & VRUE UNIVERSITEIT 8RUSSEL, LICENSING MUSIC WORKS AND 
TRANSACTION COSTS IN EUROPE: FINAL STUDY 17 (2012), [hereinafter KEA & VUB], 
available at http://www.keanet.eu/docs/music%201icensing%20and%20transaction%20costs 
%20-%20full.pdf. 
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the Transaction Costs (TC) faced by online music services in the complex 
licensing process. 
This article is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to quantify the TC 
within the online music rights licensing process, from the service providers' 
point of view. Extensive bibliographical research and interviews with 25 
relevant stakeholders in the music licensing field6 yielded information on 
market trends, on the legal framework, and on current commercial practices. 
Mainly, a survey was disseminated to 41 services providers operating in 
the UK, Spain, Czech Republic, and on a pan-European/global level, which 
provides the basis for estimates on TC. With a global response rate of 22%, 
the survey provided a sufficient amount of information on market 
developments and licensing practices, although most responses came from 
small services. There were, however, important differences in response rates 
per country. With only two services responding in the UK and in Spain, it 
was not possible to develop a global analysis concerning the quantification 
of TC in the national markets. Also, the small size of the database makes 
any attempt to generalize results tenuous. In general, the quantification of 
transaction costs resulting from the ongoing survey provides insights and 
puts forward illustrative examples rather than a complete and accurate 
picture of the online music market in the three markets. 
Section two describes the current state of the online music market, 
including the opportunities it faces and some problems encountered. Section 
three provides a legal analysis of the licensing process for online music 
services in the EU. Section four analyzes and quantifies the transaction 
costs faced by online music services. Section five concludes with a focus on 
the Creative Upstarts. 
I. A GROWING BUT NOT THRIVING ONLINE MUSIC MARKET 
A. The Online Music Market: Expanding Fast ... 
The digital music market is taking off. There are numerous music 
startups aiming to provide digital services around music7• Online music 
services such as iTunes, Spotify and Deezer are expanding their offers into 
new markets and increasing the number of titles available to consumers.8 At 
the beginning of 2012, the largest international online music services were 
available in 58 countries against 23 one year before.9 Similarly, the online 
offer of titles is steadily increasing with 13 million tracks licensed at the 
6. For a complete Jist, see KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 67. 
7. MASNICK & Ho, supra note I, at 28. 
8. IFPI 2013, supra note 4, at 5. According to the IFPI, 30 millions tracks were 
offered in 2012 (IFPI 2013, supra note 4 at 6) increasing from 20 millions tracks in 2011 
(lFPI 2012, supra note 3, at I 0). 
9. IFPl2012, supra note 3, at 4. 
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global level in 2010. 10 Digital channels account for 32% of record 
companies' revenues, which is more than any other content industry except 
for the video game industry. 11 The digital market is particularly developed 
in the U.S., Japan, and the UK. 12 
A variety of Creative Upstarts have emerged experimenting with the 
different possibilities that digital technologies offer for online music 
services. 13 In the frame of this paper, the Upstarts sometimes propose more 
innovative business models, which include advertising-based, free 
streaming services and subscription services with a freemium model. Such 
freemium services provide users on the one hand access to music content 
that is free but limited in time, choice, and on demand and/or contains 
advertising; and on the other hand paying unlimited (or less limited) access 
for subscribers.14 
More generally, digital distribution has affected existing business models 
of the music industry. Subscription services, which allow their subscribers 
to download or stream music, are developing rapidly. For example, users 
subscribing to Spotify' s paid service total around 4 million across 13 
countries in July 201215 against 1 million in 2010,16 while around 7 million 
used the free streaming service. In 2012, Deezer has 20 million users and 
1.3 million paying subscribers. 17 Other online music services include video 
sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube, Dailymotion), mobile services, and music 
in the cloud offers, e.g. Apple's iCloud that provides users access via 
Internet to their files. Such services exemplify how digital distribution has 
altered consumer behaviour, as consumers today increasingly want to access 
music at any time on any device, rather than owning music physically in 
forms of CDs or even mp3s. 18 
B .... But Still Fragile 
Still, the growth of the online market does not compensate for the 
decrease of revenues related to the decline of the compact-disc. Since the 
emergence of the Internet, the recording industry has seen its global 
10. IFPI 201 Ia, supra note 2, at 5. 
II. IFPI 2012, supra note 3, at 6. 
12. IFPI, RECORDING INDUSTRY IN NUMBERS 2011 7 (201 I) [hereinafter IFPI 201 lb]. 
13. MASNICK & Ho, supra note I , at 28. 
14. CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE (Hyperion, 1st ed. 
2009). 
15. Spotify Payout Q2 2012, SPOTIDJ (Sept. 03, 2012), http://www.spotidj.cornlblog/ 
spotify-payout-q2-20 12/. 
16. IFPI 201 lb, supra note 12. 
17. DEEZER, http://www.deezer.com/enllegal/about.php (last visited June 6, 201 2).-
18. See generally PATRIK WIKSTROM, THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: MUSIC IN THE CLOUD 
(2010). 
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turnover declining very fast, due to a rapid decrease in physical sales, in 
particular CDs. 19 
Online music offers may not be as thriving and innovative as it seems. 
Among the 500 licensed online music services in the world counted by the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPD,20 many 
services replicate the physical recording store, by essentially offering 
download-to-own services, thus following iTunes's way. More worrying, 
there does not seem to be profitable, stand-alone online music services. 
Even though figures are difficult to obtain, it seems that even Apple gains 
more revenue with the sales of iPods than through iTunes. 21 It can also be 
argued that the success of iPods has favoured the adoption of the Mac 
ecosystem by consumers. Indeed, Deezer recently announced that it has 
been profitable in France since 2011.22 But Spotify, while growing rapidly, 
has seen losses grow: Spotify grew in 2011 by 160 % to €190 million, but 
registered losses from €28 to €45 million.23 
It might be related to that situation that the music industry remains 
largely concentrated among traditional music companies, with few or no 
room for Creative Upstarts in music production and distribution, although 
the industry value chain has been disturbed by the entrance of new players 
in the market. The market is now dominated by three major music 
companies (down from six in 1998), which have a worldwide share of 70 
percent of the market for distribution: Universal Music Group, Sony Music 
Entertainment and Warner Music Group.Z4 Next to the major music 
companies, the market consists of a large number of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), often Creative Upstarts, the independent labels. 
The major music companies' control over the value chain is being 
undermined by the entrance of new actors in the industry where artists and 
independent labels can directly make deals.25 These include hardware 
19. IFPI 20 II b, supra note 12, at 7. There was, however, a slight increase in 
revenues of the recorded music industry (by 0.3%) in 2012. See IFPI 2013, supra note 4, ·at 6. 
Additionally, in order to get a full picture, other revenues should be taken into account, 
which include live concerts, synchronization, and royalties collected by Collective 
Management Organizations. Such revenues have increased in the recent years. See KEA & 
VUB, supra note 5, at 12. 
20. IFPI 20 II a, supra note 2, at 28. 
21. Brian Laung Aoaeh, Apple's iPod + iTunes Business Model, TEKEDIA (Dec. I2, 
20 I I), http://tekedia.com/3 I 377/apples-ipod-itunes-business-model/. 
22. CMU Editorial, Spotify's success is key to Deezer's, says CFO, COMPLETE MUSIC 
UPDATE (June 13, 2012), http://www.thecmuwebsite.com/article/spotifys-success-is-key-to-
deezers-says-cfo/. 
23. Greg Anderson, Spotify Revenue Numbers Lower Than Expected, Still Focused 
On Growth, ARCTICSSTARTUP (Apr. 16, 20 I 2), http://www.arcticstartup.com/20 I 2/04/16/sp 
otify-revenue-20 12. 
24. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 23. 
25. ANORA LEURDUK & OTTILIE NIEUWENHUIS, STATISTICAL, ECOSYSTEMS AND 
COMPETITIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA AND CONTENT INDUSTRIES: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
100 (Jean Paul Simon ed., 201 I). 
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companies (e.g. Apple, Nokia), mobile and Internet service providers (e.g. 
Telefonica, Vodafone), off-line and online retailers (e.g. HMV, Amazon), 
and a variety of pure players, mostly operating online services (e.g. Spotify, 
Deezer, We7). The same is true for marketing with social networks and 
other recommendation tools, which to some extent substitute traditional 
ways of marketing records. 
More generally, the value chains are becoming more complex and less 
linear.26 As a response, the majors try to be more proactive at the level of 
online services - for instance by launching online music services 
themselves, entering joint ventures, taking over services or concluding 
preferential deals with some services.27 Traditional players do still have 
important bargaining power, as they own the rights to the repertoire. 
However, some of the new market entrants act as important gatekeepers for 
making music accessible online.28 
C. A Worse Situation in the EU 
Taken as a whole, the European market still lags behind the U.S., 
although the EU accounts for more Internet users and therefore more 
potential consumers for digital music.29 In 2010, digital music revenue 
amounted to $2 billion in the U.S. and $996 million in Europe?0 In addition, 
almost half of all music revenues came from the digital sector in the U.S. in 
2010 (52% in 2011 ), while physical sales still accounted for 73% of all 
music revenues in Europe.31 Furthermore, the national markets in Europe 
have not developed similarly: in 2010, the digital share of recorded music 
sales varied from 2% in Hungary to 29% in Denmark.32 
These imbalances are reflected in the expansion of international service 
providers. Apart from the two global services, Traxsource and Classics 
Online, which have been available worldwide since their creation, most EO-
wide services were first launched in specific countries or groups of 
countries, before expanding to new territories (e.g. iTunes, Spotify, 7 
Digital, Napster, Rara, Emusic). As a result there are fewer pan-European 
services than there could be. In 2010, there were 21 music service providers 
in the U.S.,33 while in Europe there were only 14 services that were 
specifically targeting several European markets. 
26. See generally The "Content Flat-Rate": A Solution to Illegal File-Sharing?, 
P ARL. EuR. Doc. PE 460.058 (20 11 ), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/ 
2009 _20 14/documents/cult/dv/esstudycontentflatrate/esstudycontentflatrateen.pdf. 
27. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 24. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. at 16. 
30. /d. 
31. IFPI 20llb, supra note 12 at 8. 
32. /d. at 43, 48. 
33. lFPI 20llb, supra note 12, at 6. 
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Our more detailed analysis of the UK, Spain, and the Czech Republic 
shows first that the more developed a market, the bigger the variety of 
business models used by services and therefore more opportunities for the 
Creative Upstarts. Thus, in the UK, customers can choose from a wide 
range of 51 services, from the traditional download-to-own on a pay-as-you-
go basis to innovative "all-included" services, which cover streaming, 
download-to-own, and even mobile services.34 In contrast, in the Czech 
Republic the traditional download-to-own on a pay-as-you-go model 
prevails.35 
Secondly, the more developed a market, the more varied the kinds of 
service providers. Thus in the UK and Spain, service providers include 
record labels, hardware producers, Internet service providers, mobile 
operators, and retailers.36 The Czech market is essentially borne by record 
labels and (since autumn 2011) iTunes.37 Thirdly, the more developed the 
market, the bigger the incentive for international (potential pan-European) 
services to enter first. 
II. HOW DOES LICENSING WORK AND WHAT MAKES IT COMPLEX? 
A. The Various Rights Holders and their Exclusive Rights 
The multiplicity of right holders (authors, performers, record producers) 
and of rights to acquire (making-available and reproduction rights) makes 
licensing processes complex. Actually, all of these rights have to be cleared 
for all right holders. This corresponds to a fragmentation of rights, which 
generates multiple transactions in an uncertain context. All this increases 
TC. 
First, every music track has several right holders. These include (i) the 
"authors" (composers and lyricists, who respectively write the music and 
the lyrics); (ii) the "performers" (singers and musicians, who interpret the 
music and the lyrics created by the authors); (iii) the record producer, who 
makes the financial investment to record the performance; (iv) the music 
publisher, who acts as manager of the author and is in charge of issuing 
licenses to users of the music, marketing and promotion of the music and 
collecting income from licenses.38 
Authors, performers, and record producers have a set of legally 
recognized rights to control the exploitation of their works. In order to 
ensure better management of their rights, authors and performers usually 
assign, license, or entrust all or parts of their rights to a third party that will 
34. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 18. 
35. /d. at 20. 
36. Id. at 18-20. 
37. /d. at 20-21. 
38. ANN HARRISON, MUSIC: THE BUSINESS: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE LAW AND 
THE DEALS 112-117 (5th ed. 20 II). 
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take care of exploiting or managing those rights. Such third parties are 
publishers for authors and record labels for performers.39 Music publishers 
are not considered copyright owners by law, but usually become copyright 
holders by virtue of the transfer of rights from the author.40 
In addition, one track usually does not only have multiple right holders; 
there are also several different rights granted to these persons by copyright 
law. Composers and lyricists have a recognized set of economic rights to 
their compositions and lyrics. Performers and record producers are also 
entitled to some economic rights (the so-called related or neighboring 
rights) respectively on the fixations of their performances and on the first 
fixation of the sound (recording).41 For all of them, online music services 
need to clear the making available (or "performing") right and the 
reproduction (or "mechanical") right, as it is considered that copies of the 
work are made when downloading. 
In the EU, these rights are granted to authors and holders of neighboring 
rights in the Directive 2001/29/EC.42 This Directive transposes the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties, notably its 
recital 15.43 More recent legislative developments in the European arena 
include the Directive 2011177/EU.44 In order to harmonize the rules 
governing the activities of Collective Management Organizations (CMOs), 
the European Commission introduced in 2012 a legislative proposal for a 
Directive on collective rights management and the multi-territorial licensing 
of rights in musical works for online uses. 
As a consequence of EU's attempts to harmonies copyright legislation 
across the Union, few differences continue to exist between Member States, 
at least concerning the online distribution of music. However, business 
practices can vary greatly across the EU. 
39. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 27. 
40. Violaine Dehin, The Future of Legal Online Music Services in the European 
Union: A Review of the EU Commission's Recent Initiatives in Cross-Border Copyright 
Management, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 220, 222 (2010). 
41. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 26. 
42. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) I 0, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001: 167:001 0:0019:EN:PDF. 
43. It harmonizes national copyright and neighboring rights legislations to adapt to 
technological and commercial developments relating to the rise of digital technology. 
44. Directive 20IIn71EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2011 Amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the Term of Protection of Copyright 
and Certain Related Rights, 2011 O.J. (L 265) I, I, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011 :265:0001 :0005:EN:PDF. 
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B. The Organization of Copyright 
Right holders are free to choose whether they want to administer their 
rights for online uses themselves or through a CMO. Usually, authors 
choose to administer their rights through CMOs, hence each CMOs' 
repertoire encompasses a large catalogue of rights on musical works.45 The 
CMOs' operations have been highly criticized because of opacity and their 
inability to respond to the needs of the online environment.46 
One consequence is that there have been important changes in the past 
years regarding licenses for the multi-territorial use of musical works.47 This 
change is linked to the European Commission's activity in the field of 
music licensing aimed at facilitating cross-border licensing. 
Traditionally, CMOs were able to license for their own territory their 
national repertoires as well as the repertoires of CMOs of other countries 
due to a system of reciprocal agreements between these societies.48 This 
system allows copyright users to obtain territorial "blanket licenses" for the 
world repertoire through the CMOs of their country of establishment. If 
CMOs wished to offer services in a number of territories, they had to 
negotiate with each CMO in each territory. 
In 2005 the European Commission published a Recommendation "on 
collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services,"49 advocating multi-territorial licensing for 
the online environment. It asked Member States to enable rights holders to 
assign the management of the right holders' online rights to any CMO on a 
territorial scope of their choice. In addition, it asked Member States and to 
give right holders the right to withdraw any of the online rights and transfer 
the multi-territorial management of such rights to another collecting society, 
regardless of the Member State of residence or the nationality of the CMO 
or of the rights holder.50 The direct consequence of the actions undertaken 
by the Commission was the withdrawal of the major publishers' Anglo-
American repertoire from traditional CMOs and the creation of new entities 
to manage their mechanical rights in relation to multi-territorial uses.51 
45. Dehin, supra note 40. 
46. KEA, THE COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS IN EUROPE-THE QUEST FOR 
EFFICIENCY, study prepared for European Parliament 14 and 46 (2006). 
47. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 29. 
48. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 277 (3d ed. 
2011). 
49. Commission Recommendation 20051737/EC, on Collective Cross-Border 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, 2005 
0.1. (L 276) 54, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2 
005:276:0054:0057:EN:PDF. 
50. Commission Recommendation 20051737/EC, supra note 49. 
51. HELLENIC FOUND. FOR EUR. & FOREIGN POL'Y (ELIAMEP), COLLECTING 
SOCIETIES AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE MUSIC SECTOR 26-29 (2009), available at 
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These new licensing entities are managed and owned by several traditional 
CMOs such as CELAS for Electric and Musical Industries Ltd (EMI), 
managed and owned jointly by Gesellschaft fur musikalische Auffii.hrungs-
und mechanische Vervielfiiltigungsrechte (GEMA) and PRS for music.52 
Many independent publishers, following the example of major 
publishers, have also entrusted the PRS to manage their rights through a 
new licensing entity to facilitate multi-territorial rights management of 
Anglo-American repertoires (IMPEL).53 Some collecting societies now 
issue multi-territorial licenses on their own repertoire and also on the 
repertoire of other collecting societies. 54 
This implies that today music repertoires are even more fragmented than 
they were before 2005. Rights to the entire music repertoire are managed by 
an increasing number of different management entities that cannot always 
accurately identify the rights they manage, due to the dispersed and 
fragmentary nature of both the rights and right holders. 55 
C. The Organization of Neighbouring Right 
In general, while the management of authors' and publishers' online 
rights is entrusted to CMOs, the management of performers' and record 
producers' exclusive rights is done either directly or through commercial 
third parties, such as aggregators.56 More precisely, the performer transfers 
all, or substantial parts, of their online rights to his/her record producer and 
receives royalties, i.e. a percentage of the revenues on the recording. Hence 
the record producer administers the performers' rights, as well as its own 
rights on the sound recording. While major and large independent record 
labels often handle the management of their own (and the performers') 
rights, smaller independent record labels often pass through aggregators to 
deliver their music works to online platforms. 57 
Interviews show that aggregators convert and encode music formats and 
deliver technical copies of the music, and act as distributors of music over 
the Internet, negotiating the deals directly or through an intermediary with 
online music services. Aggregators usually have exclusive contracts with 
the record labels they represent. At the national level, they negotiate deals 
directly with the online music service providers. Frequently, established 
music services use standard agreements. As a result, negotiations are quite 
http://www.eliamep.gr/en/category/european-integration/collecting-societies-and-cultural-
diversity-in-the-music-sector/. 
52. For a complete list of these entities see KEA & VUB, supra note 4, at 31. 
53. /d. at 37. 
54. PARL. EuR. Doc. PE 496.734, supra note 16, at 3. 
55. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 30. 
56. Aggregators (e.g., The Orchard, PIAS UK, Zebralutions) should not be confused 
with the new licensing entities that deal with copyrights. 
57. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 31. 
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rapid - as there is almost no negotiation - and Transaction Costs are 
reduced for service providers, in comparison to a situation where they 
would need to negotiate with every record producer. 58 
D. Licensing Process for Services in the EU 
The following figures illustrate the complexity of acquiring licenses for 
online music services, in particular those active in several EU territories. 
They were designed based on interviews.59 Services accessible in only one 
territory will usually have to acquire rights from the local CMOs for authors 
and publishers and from record labels.60 In general, this scenario applies to 
smaller services operating only in the local territory. Larger services 
operating in the local territory will mostly have to negotiate the major 
publishers' repertoire directly and big European local repertoires with the 
national CMOs. The provider will have to deal with CMOs for authors' and 
publishers' rights. On the other hand, record labels administer their own 
rights together with the online rights of performers. Services providers 
negotiate directly with the record labels or with aggregators. 
{- -----
: ~fgital Warehouse 
~-r----
,j, 
Major record Independent 
producer record 
Caption; 
producers 
Usual practice 
Service seldom used 
Figure 1: Licensing for small services accessible in one territory61 
58. Aggregators themselves face additional transaction costs derived from the 
negotiation with the record producer they represent. 
59. See KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 32-37 (and at 64 for a complete list of 
interviewees). 
60. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 31. 
61. !d. at 35. 
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To operate in several territories, service providers have to negotiate with 
several different entities. The next figure illustrates the case when the online 
service provider wishes to offer a catalogue as large as possible. This would 
include the Anglo-American repertoire as well as local repertoires (from 
both majors and independents) from the various countries, in which the 
service is accessible. Consequently, service providers will have to negotiate 
with all the right holders and other entities involved. 
Publishers' and authors' rights Record producers' Rights 
( MERLIN ) 
Caption: 
Usual practice 
Service often used 
Service seldom used 
Figure 2: Licensing process for services accessible in several territories 
* For Baltic and Nordic repertoires (making available and reproduction rights). 
** For French, Italian and Spanish repertoires (making available and reproduction 
rights). 
III. THE COSTS OF LICENSING FOR MUSIC SERVICES 
A. Definition and Identification of Transaction Costs 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) - a.k.a. neo-institutional economics 
- was developed notably by Oliver Williamson62 and the use of TCE in the 
62. MATTHIAS KLAES. TRANSACTION COSTS, HISTORY OF, in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (2008), available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics 
.com/article?id=pde2008_T000239; see generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Chapter 3 
Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION]. 
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branch of the law and economics of copyright is now relatively 
commonplace.63 TCE is focused on transactions, which can be defined as 
the transfer _of property rights (here, intellectual property rights (lPR)), 
whereas property rights relate to the rights of the individuals to use, alter, 
generate income from and transfer resources.64 TCE aims to analyze the 
conditions of a transaction and has been applied to various social situations 
-from the functioning of an industry to the relationships within a family.65 
Here the transactions concern the licensing of IPR to online music services. 
This section focuses on ex ante Transaction Costs (TC). TC include all 
the costs incurred when a transaction takes place. Williamson compares TC 
to friction in physics:66 without them transactions would be much easier; it 
is worth trying to reduce them but it is never possible to suppress them 
entirely. It is common to distinguish between ex ante and ex post TC. Ex 
ante costs are all the costs incurred before a transaction and ex post costs are 
all the costs incurred after a transaction.67 The online music market is still 
young and there are many Creative Upstarts, therefore it is more relevant to 
focus on ex ante costs, which arise during the establishment of a service.68 
Based on Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen69 and Picot et al,70 the 
typology of ex ante TC for rights for online distribution of music content 
includes: (i) identification costs, which correspond to all the costs incurred 
to identify and find the rights owners; (ii) negotiation costs, which 
correspond to all the costs incurred between identification and the actual 
agreement. 
This article focuses on the TC supported by the online music services. 
This approach is rarely considered in research on TC in online content 
markets. Previous studies consider TC at a general level, without 
necessarily entering into the details of the TC faced by every partner.71 
63. Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 192 (B. Bouckaert & G. Degeest eds., 2000). 
64. Markus Anding & Thomas Hess, Online Content Syndication - A Critical 
Analysis From the Perspective of Transaction Cost Theory, ECIS 2002 PROC. 551, 553 
(2002), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2002/86. 
65. WILLIAMSON, supra note 62. 
66. /d. at 142. 
67. KEA & VUB, supra 5, at 42. 
68. However while it is analytically possible to distinguish between these costs, in 
reality there are strong links between both. Actually, ex ante costs are borne to try to prevent 
ex post abuses. In addition every agent tries to assess ex ante the reliability of the other party 
in order to determine the conditions/circumstances under which there could be a transaction. 
69. Gerd Hansen & Albrecht Schmidt-Bischoffshausen, Economic Functions of 
Collecting Societies - Collective Rights Management in the Light of Transaction Cost- and 
Information Economics, I (Oct. 19, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i 
d=998328. 
70. See generally ARNOLD PICOT ET AL., DIE GRENZENLOSE UNTERNEHMUNG (4th ed. 
2001). 
71. See, e.g., Hal Varian, Transactions Costs and Copyright, WIPO, (Sept. 15, 
20 I 0), http://www. wipo.intledocs/mdocs/copyrightlen/wipo_ip_econ_ge_ 4_1 0/wipo_ip_eco 
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When such previous studies focus on one partner, they often consider the 
role played by CMOs in reducing or increasing TC.72 
B. What Causes Higher Transaction Costs? An Overview of the 
Literature 
This section develops assumptions about the characteristics of 
transaction, which have an impact on TC in online music licensing. To do 
so, this section covers two kinds of literature: general literature on TC 
theory and literature on online music licensing. According to Williamson,73 
transactions differ along three dimensions, which have an impact on their 
related costs: asset specificity, uncertainty, and the frequency of 
transactions. Before analyzing each dimension, the impact of the number of 
transactions is considered. 
1. The Number of Transactions 
Every transaction incurs costs; hence the total TC of a firm increases 
with the number of transactions. Thus, from a general perspective digital 
technologies increase TC because they make more content available.74 
Online music service providers must identify and negotiate for every 
additional country where they will be present. Therefore, it is anticipated 
that online music services which are available in several countries face 
higher TC than those which are available in only one country. In other 
words, multi-territorial accessibility increases TC75 unless an efficient and 
operative system of multi-territorial licensing (e.g. one-stop shop) is in 
place, so that service providers do not need to clear licenses in each 
territory. 
Online music service providers must also identify and negotiate with a 
variety of right holders for the different repertoires they want to add to their 
catalogue, with each repertoire comprising anything from one to millions of 
titles. Therefore it is expected that online music services with bigger 
catalogues face higher TC than online music services with smaller 
catalogues. However, TC are not necessarily proportional to stze, a 
transaction will in general cover more than one title, e.g. one major's 
n_ge_ 4_10_www_I42277.pdf. 
72. This is notably the case for Hansen & Schmidt-Bischoffshausen, supra note 44; 
see Roya Ghafele & Benjamin Gibert, Counting the Costs of Collective Rights Management 
of Music Copyright in Europe, MPRA I, 7 (Oct. 17, 20 II), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/ 
34646/ 1/MPRA_paper _34646.pdf. 
73. See generally, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS, A STUDY IN THE EcONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 
(1975). 
74. Varian, supra note 71, at 2. 
75. LEURDUK & NIEUWENHUIS, supra note 25, at 75. 
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catalogue. Conversely, cases also arise where one or a few titles require 
several transactions. 
2. Dimension 1: Asset Specificity 
Assets include all economic resources owned or controlled by firms to 
produce value. Assets are said to be specific when their owner cannot 
redeploy them for alternative uses without a significant cost.76 Business 
partners investing in specific assets face delicate negotiating positions 
because they need a transaction to take place, otherwise they will have lost 
money by investing in an asset that cannot be redeployed without a cost. 
However, the higher the specificity, the harder it is to find partners willing 
to invest in such assets. 
From the service provider's point of view, the assets comprise all the 
resources acquired to set up the music service.77 Most online music services 
(at least the more generalist ones) cannot avoid making deals with the right 
holders that own or manage rights for the most important parts of the 
repertoire. This is one reason why major publishers and major record 
producers are in a better position in negotiations. It is therefore expected 
that online music services will face higher negotiation costs when dealing 
with major publishers and major record producers. 
The case is more ambiguous for CMOs. CMOs are unavoidable business 
partners since they provide both local blanket licenses and multi-territory 
licenses.78 However, their bargaining power might be lower because in 
general they must have uniform conditions for all users.79 In addition, 
CMOs are often obliged by law to provide licenses to users.8° For these 
reasons, researchers tend to conclude that CMOs help to reduce TC,81 in 
particular because instead of every service provider negotiating with every 
right holder, service providers have to negotiate only with one, or a few, 
CMOs.82 
On the contrary, CMOs could increase TC, in particular for Creative 
Upstarts. Actually, innovative services may not benefit from the uniform 
conditions, as their services are not easily comparable to the existing ones. 
Moreover, licensing processes can be long and CMOs can still decide on 
76. HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 142. 
77. The other assets are the musical works, which belong to the right holders. 
However, the recording companies do not necessarily need to be present on these services. 
78. KEA & VUB, supra 5, at 44. 
79. Qhafele & Gibert, supra note 72, at 7. 
80. KEA & VUB, supra 5, at 44. 
81. See generally STRATEGIC ADVISORY BOARD FOR INTELL. PROP. POL'Y (SABIP), 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT LAW (2010) [hereinafter SABIP], 
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uklpro-ipresearch/ipresearch-right/ipresearch-right-copy.htm 
82. Hansen & Schmidt-Bischoffshausen, supra note 69, at 8. 
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rates, which are sometimes claimed to be too expensive for innovative 
services.83 
In addition, in some territories, access to the local repertoire can be 
crucial; the local repertoire may be owned or managed by independent 
record producers. Therefore, some independent record producers may have 
higher bargaining power, which may slow down negotiations. 
3. Dimension 2: Frequency of Transactions 
Frequency corresponds to the number of transactions, over a given 
period, that take place between business partners.84 The impact of frequency 
on TC (e.g. through duration of licenses or the conditions for their renewal) 
is ambiguous. Actually when partners have more frequent transactions, this 
can decrease as well as increase the costs relating to each transaction. 
Therefore, no assumption could be derived from this dimension.85 
4. Dimension 3: Uncertainty and the Behavioral Assumptions 
Uncertainty refers to both unpredictable external events (e.g. a new 
technology allowing new uses) and behavioral uncertainty.86 The greater the 
uncertainty, the higher the TC,87 sometimes to the extent that uncertainty 
prevents transactions from taking place at all. The impact of uncertainty on 
costs is connected with, and primarily results from, opportunism and 
bounded rationality.88 
Bounded rationality corresponds to the fact that human decisions are 
limited by the information available, their ability to analyse that 
information, and the time they have to make a decision. 89 More generally, 
decisions become less "rational" (and hence uncertainty is increased) due to 
a wider availability of transaction opportunities--with more content being 
available and technology enabling Internet users to have access to services 
and content from all around the world--or the fact that information goods 
(i.e. musical works) are difficult to value.90 
Opportunism corresponds to the fact that no business partner can 
completely trust the other. This mainly has an impact on negotiations, since 
each contractor tries to assess the risks and put in place written clauses to 
83. ELIAMEP (2009), supra note 52 at 93; see also Robert Andrews, It's Time For 
Transparency On Music Streaming Rates, PAID CONTENT (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:09 AM), 
http://paidcontent.org/20 11111/16/419-its-time-for-transparency-on-music-streaming-rates/. 
84. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 44. 
85. /d. 
86. HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 143. 
87. SABIP, supra note 81, at 54. 
88. Anding & Hess, supra note 40, at 557. 
89. See generally HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 291 (4th ed. 1997). 
90. Anding & Hess, supra note 40, at 555. 
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protect them from opportunistic behavior. Thus, right holders can be more 
reluctant to reach an agreement because they suspect online music service 
providers do not respect copyright.91 This can also have an impact on 
identification costs because right holders have the incentive to let online 
music service providers meet all the identification costs.92 
Uncertainty is reinforced by the lack of transparency around repertoire 
ownership, i.e., the lack of information available on which work belongs to 
which right holder(s). The service providers are dependent on the 
information about rights ownership, which is controlled by right holders.93 
In addition, the interviewed service providers complained that right holders, 
and in particular CMOs and some of the new licensing entities, are unable 
to properly identify their own catalogue of works and rights. 
Because the use of music content by online services is relatively new, 
transactions take place in an uncertain environment, which may make 
partners more reluctant to reach an agreement. Therefore, it is expected that 
some online music services will face higher TC than others. This is the case 
for the Creative Upstarts because they are new players. In other words, the 
study assumed that online music services owned by traditional music 
industry players face lower TC. These services have the most experience in 
the music industry and as a result should be able to identify the right holders 
more easily. They may also have more credibility when negotiating, 
especially compared to newcomers Creative Upstarts. In addition, they may 
already own or manage rights. 
Conversely, the most innovative services in terms of business models 
will face higher TC, i.e., online music services that propose streaming or 
subscription services face higher TC than services which operate on a 
download-to-own model. In addition, the agreements the service providers 
obtain may not allow them to easily modify their business model (e.g., their 
commercial offer). 
C. Where the Transaction Costs Are: An Analysis Based on a Sample 
of Services94 
1. Total Transaction Costs and their Impact on the Roll Out of 
New Services 
According to the estimates, services available in several countries, and 
with an offer of more than I million titles, could face yearly TC of up to 
€260,000 and employ six full-time equivalents staff (FfE).95 Services 
91. !d. at 555. 
92. Varian, supra note 71, at 17. 
93. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 45. 
94. The size of the sample of services does not allow isolating the impact of a given 
factor. 
95. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 59. 
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available in only one country and with a very small (less than 2,000 titles) 
and specialized catalogue (e.g. in local indie rock) could face yearly 
spending of €6,000 and employ 0.5 FTE.96 
The difficulties faced in the licensing process also impact the dynamics 
of the market, specifically the time needed to launch a service. According to 
the estimations, the identification of the right holders can take up to six 
months and the negotiations as long as two years.97 This long process is 
likely to slow down the rolling out by Creative Upstarts of innovative online 
music services. 
The approach used in the study did not assess the whole impact of TC on 
the time taken to launch a service. Actually TC theory is more relevant to 
static analysis.98 It is also possible that the time taken to identify, and 
negotiate with, right holders does not cause a delay in the launch of the 
service because other processes take place at the same moment (e.g. 
technical development of the platform). 
2. Fragmentation of Rights Increases the Transaction Costs for 
the Music Service Provider 
With fragmentation, every use of a track requires multiple authorisations, 
from several right holders, thus a higher number of transactions.99 
Interviews confirm that fragmentation of rights increases TC for online 
music services, in particular those available in several countries and/or with 
a bigger catalogue. 
The fragmentation of rights adds to the uncertainty of the environment in 
which the service providers operate, and interviewed service providers 
frequently claim that they are rarely sure that for any track or repertoire they 
have acquired all the relevant rights. 100 Rights ownership depends partly on 
recording contracts, which are often difficult to trace. In many cases, 
contracts have been drafted years before online music platforms appeared 
and therefore do not refer to uses that could be particularly relevant to 
online distribution, e.g. the making available of individual tracks. Thus in 
2010, Pink Floyd won a court claim against EMI which prevented the 
record company from selling downloads of individual tracks from the 
band's albums on the Intemet. 101 In the end, Pink Floyd and EMI reached an 
agreement which allowed Pink Floyd's music to be available as individual 
96. /d. 
97. /d. 
98. Bart Nooteboom, Towards a Dynamic Theory of Transactions, 2 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY EcON. 281 (I 992). 
99. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 47. 
100. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 47. 
101. Jane Croft, Pink Floyd Wins EM/ Court Case, FIN. TIMES (March II, 2010, 
6:51PM), http://www.servizi-italiani.net/allegati/20 I 0/3/12/269648_288698.pdf. 
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tracks and as albums. 102 However, this shows that online music service 
providers may be depen~ent on litigation around contracts of which they 
were initially not a part. 
Uncertainty is further reinforced by the lack of identification systems and 
databases, in particular for CMOs and some new licensing entities. The 
internet exacerbates the problem by enabling more uses and because the 
technology makes it easier to go beyond national borders. 103 For all these 
reasons, the fragmentation of rights increases identification and negotiation 
costs. 104 
3. Multi-Territory Services Face Higher Transaction Costs 
TC are higher for services available in several countries than for those 
available in only one country, which confirms the conclusions in the 
literature105 and those drawn from interviews. Services in the sample which 
were available in several countries use twice the manpower for licensing 
rights than services available in only one country (3.1 and 1.7 FTE, 
respectively). 106 Expressed in financial terms, total costs are four times 
higher for services available in several countries (€118,000) than in one 
country (€29,000). The main reason is that online music service providers 
need to duplicate their costs when they make their service available in 
another country. With the absence of easy means to acquire multi-territory 
licenses, TC constitutes a huge barrier for online music services which aim 
to operate in all EU countries. 
In particular, negotiations are more costly for services available in 
several countries. 107 It takes online music providers, on average, one year 
and three months to negotiate with major publishers, compared with nine 
months for services available in one country. It also takes them on average 
three months to negotiate with the CMOs for authors, in comparison to one 
week for services available in one country. 
However, although our argument is that licensing with one local right 
holder (e.g. CMO) results in lower TC than acquiring a multi-territory 
license, this does not necessarily mean that licensing with many (e.g. 27) 
local right holders to get the equivalent of one multi-territory license results 
in lower transaction costs than multi-territorial licenses. 108 Thus, a situation 
102. Michelle Castillo, Pink Floyd Gives Into EM/, Will Still Sell Individual Tracks, 
TIME (Jan. 4, 2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/0I/04/pink-floyd-gives-into-emi-will-
still-sell-individual-tracks/. 
103. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 47. See also Varian, supra note, at 72. 
104. WORKING GROUP ON COPYRIGHT, Copyright in the Music and Audiovisual 
Sectors (20 II). 
] 05. LEURDIJIK & NJEUWENHUIS, supra note 25, at 71. 
106. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 47. 
107. /d. 
108. /d. 
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in which every right must be acquired on a strictly territorial basis is 
inadvisable, even though it is moderately easy to acquire a license in every 
territory. 
4. The Type of Right Holders has an Impact on Negotiation costs 
The analysis confirms that the greatest negotiation costs are faced in 
negotiating with major record producers and new licensing entities (granting 
multi-territoriallicenses). 109 For example, it takes one year for one service in 
our sample to negotiate with major record producers compared to only one 
week with indie record producers or with indie publishers. Similarly for 
another service, it takes one year and a half to negotiate with new licensing 
entities, two years with major record producers and 'only' one year with 
indie record producers. 
This confirms that majors wield their higher negotiation power based on 
the size of their catalogue and the fact that they are unavoidable partners for 
most online music services. 110 Accordingly, all respondents rated the 
negotiations with majors as "unreasonably costly or time-consuming." The 
distinction between CMOs and independent record producers is less 
straightforward. For most services in the sample, negotiations are as long 
with CMO as with independent producers. 
Finally, TC concerning the negotiation with the new entities created by 
the major publishers for multi-territorial licensing are still very high, thus 
one respondent indicated that negotiations can take up to two years. 111 
5. Services that Propose a Bigger Catalogue Incur Greater 
Transaction Costs 
Online music services were distinguished according to the number of 
titles in total in their catalogue (irrespective of the size of the catalogue for 
every territory). A distinction was drawn between services with a catalogue 
of around 1,000 or 2,000 titles and those with more than 1 million titles. 
As expected, TC are higher for services providing access to a higher 
number of titles. 112 There is however no proportionality in the cost gap. 
Thus, it takes two months for the services with a catalogue of less than 
2,000 titles to identify right holders against four months for those with a 
catalogue of more than 1 million titles. Services with a catalogue of more 
than 1 million titles employ in average 4.7 FTE to deal with the licensing of 
rights, which costs them in average €163,000. On the other side, services 
with a catalogue of less than 2,000 titles employ in average 0. 7 FfE to deal 
109. /d. at 48. 
110. /d. 
Ill. /d. 
112. KEA & VUB, supra note 5, at 49. 
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with the licensing of rights, which costs them in average €9,000. This is 
illustrated when comparing two services in our sample. The first offers 17 
million titles and incurs costs equivalent to around €220,000 every year to 
identify, and negotiate with, right holders; whereas the second one offers 
around I 00 albums and incurs costs equivalent to around €6,500. 113 
6. The Level of Transaction Costs Depends on the Service 
Providers' Main Activity 
Online music services were distinguished depending on their provider's 
main activity: pure online music services (services that are independent or 
belong to online content providers); companies that are technology-driven 
(e.g. producing mobile devices or ISP); and record labels. 
The analysis shows that identification costs, which are the lowest for 
record labels (almost immediate) compared to online music services (ten 
weeks) and technology companies (six months). This does not facilitate the 
entrance for Creative Upstarts. 
7. Services Based on More Established Business Models Face 
Lower Transaction Costs 
Online music services are distinguished according to their business 
model (i.e. to their revenue model and or their type of content service), with 
two categories: services providing permanent downloads on a pay-as-you-
go basis; streaming services with subscriptions. More recently, the latter can 
be considered as Creative Upstarts. In addition, downloading services' 
revenue model is more akin to the traditional revenue model in the 
recording industry based on the sales of recordings. 
As expected, streaming services in the sample employ 3.9 FI'E to deal 
with online music rights licensing against 2.6 FI'E for downloading 
services, i.e., €133,200 and €95,400, respectively. 114 
CONCLUSION 
According to the estimations based on the survey, an online music 
platform aiming to provide multi-territorial services in Europe would have 
to invest an average €230,000 in transaction costs alone to get a license for a 
catalogue of more than one million titles. This is a large amount given that 
most online music services still do not break even and that this figure only 
refers to transaction costs and must be considered by the service providers 
in addition to other key investments, notably technological infrastructure 
and license fees. 
113. /d. at 50. 
114. /d. 
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The fragmentation of rights, right holders and repertoires is the 
cornerstone of the problem. Online music service providers willing to set up 
multi-territorial services need to enter into negotiations with a multiplicity 
of right holders and managing entities: record producers, aggregators, 
CMOs for publishers and authors, new entities for publishers' rights, etc. 
The providers also need to acquire making available and reproduction 
rights, which can be split between different right holders for the same title. 
This multiple fragmentation together with territorial licensing practices 
makes it extremely costly to license multi-territorial services. 
The bargaining power of certain right holders, in particular major 
publishers and record producers, puts service providers (mainly medium to 
small) in a difficult negotiating position. This is becauset hose right holders 
hold the assets that online music services with a generalist catalogue need to 
acquire. Right holders seem to make extensive use of this bargaining power, 
according to interviews with service providers. This--together with the 
finding that the more innovative the business model, the bigger the 
transaction costs--makes things particularly difficult for the online music 
Creative Upstarts. 
Finally an additional factor multiplying transaction costs is the right 
holders' inability to properly identify their own catalogue of works and 
rights and the lack of uniform standards for the monitoring, reporting and 
invoicing of related uses. 
All these factors contribute to slow the licensing process and, 
consequently, the installment of cross-border European services. In this 
context, transaction costs are particularly high for Creative Upstarts, namely 
on the one hand services experimenting with hybrid and/or innovative 
business models. Uncertain revenue streams and consumer acceptance of 
their business models weaken their bargaining position, as well as their 
capacity to lead lengthy negotiations with right holders. 
On the other hand, services launched by new market entrants have no 
long-lasting link with the traditional music industry and might lack 
important knowledge about the functioning of the music industry when 
setting up those services. 
The main recommendation towards Creative Upstarts is guaranteeing 
that powerful players license on fair and reasonable terms, which ensures a 
competitive market and allows Creative Upstarts to flourish. This goes 
along with other recommendations already partly analyzed in the study. 115 
Such analysis would nevertheless deserve more research. 
115. /d. 
